On Democratic Removal of Authoritarians

In "Fascists Can Fall to Elections," John Marks responds to my recent piece "I Researched Every Attempt to Stop Fascism" with a compelling counterargument. He presents historical examples from Argentina, Chile, South Korea, Poland, East Germany, Serbia, Tunisia, and Ukraine where authoritarian regimes were removed through electoral pressure. Marks argues that my claim that fascists "never" lose power democratically overlooks important post-1945 transitions where "elections became a weapon that, when defended, forced dictatorships to give way." These examples deserve serious consideration. However, our fundamental disagreement lies not in the facts, but in what these facts mean for understanding authoritarian resilience.

My original piece focused on fascist movements that win power democratically and then systematically dismantle democratic institutions from within, as they have in inevitably do. Marks correctly identifies several authoritarian regimes that fell through electoral pressure, but most of these cases differ fundamentally from the pattern I described.

The regimes in Chile, Argentina, and South Korea came to power through military coups, not elections. They never had democratic legitimacy to begin with. When they attempted to legitimize themselves through controlled elections (Pinochet's plebiscite, South Korea's constitutional reforms), they created openings they couldn't close. This is categorically different from movements that win power democratically and then erode democracy from within.

Poland in 1989 and East Germany were Soviet-imposed regimes that never won a free election. When Soviet support wavered, they had no legitimate foundation to fall back on. The same applies to Tunisia's Ben Ali, who inherited power through a palace coup. These regimes fell when forced to face real elections for the first time; they didn't lose power through elections after winning it democratically.

Poland 2023 is actually the most relevant case, and it supports rather than refutes my concern. PiS came to power democratically and spent eight years eroding judicial independence and media freedom. They lost an election, yes, but only because they hadn't fully consolidated power. They still control the presidency and can block reforms. The damage they did to institutions remains. This is precisely the dangerous window I'm warning about.

Milošević and Yanukovych are instructive cases. Both attempted to steal elections and faced massive popular resistance. But note the pattern: it wasn't the ballot alone that removed them. It took hundreds of thousands in the streets, strikes, international pressure, and in Milošević's case, prior military defeat and economic collapse. The elections were the spark, but the street was the engine. Moreover, Milošević had already been in power for 13 years when he fell. That's over a decade of destroyed lives and ruined institutions before electoral pressure finally worked, and only when combined with massive civil resistance.

My argument was never that authoritarian removal is impossible; it's that once authoritarians win power democratically and begin dismantling democratic guardrails, removal becomes extraordinarily difficult and usually requires extraordinary means beyond normal electoral politics. The examples Marks cites actually reinforce this: military juntas fell when they sought electoral legitimacy they never had; Soviet satellites collapsed when their external support ended; even successful removals required massive civil resistance beyond voting; and the most relevant case, Poland 2023, shows an incomplete victory against a partially consolidated regime.

Notably absent from Marks' successful examples is Hungary's Orbán, who won democratically in 2010 and has now created what he calls "illiberal democracy." Despite controlling elections that are free but not fair, he keeps winning. This is the trajectory I'm warning about: not military juntas seeking legitimacy, but democratically elected leaders who systematically rig the game while maintaining electoral theater.

The distinction between these historical cases and our current moment is crucial. When authoritarians inherit power through coups or foreign imposition, they lack legitimacy and social base. When they win it through elections, they have both, plus the ability to claim democratic mandate while dismantling democratic institutions.

Marks is right that elections can matter when defended by "unity, civic resistance, and international support." But that's precisely my point: elections alone aren't enough. Once authoritarians begin consolidating power, removing them requires extraordinary mobilization that goes far beyond normal democratic politics.

You can’t win Calvinball by playing by Calvinball rules.

The danger isn't believing elections can never work; it's believing they'll work the same way they do in healthy democracies. When you're facing opponents who treat democracy as a ladder to kick away once climbed, conventional democratic responses are insufficient. That's not defeatism; it's recognition that defending democracy against those who would destroy it requires more than just showing up to vote.

The historical record shows that ballots can topple dictatorships, but usually only when combined with mass mobilization, elite defection, economic pressure, and often violence or its threat. Pretending otherwise doesn't honor the struggles of those who fought these regimes; it minimizes the extraordinary courage and sacrifice their victories required.