Between Democracy and Dictatorship: Where We Are and How Long We Have

There won’t be a day when we wake up and the Wikipedia page suddenly says “The US is a Fascist Christian Ethnostate.” That’s not how authoritarian takeover works for people living through it. When did it happen? Some say Jan 6. Others point to Trump’s subsequent lack of consequences, or his “revenge tour” victory. In the words of Christopher Wallace: things done changed.

The coup already happened. Leading scholars of democratic backsliding now classify the United States as a competitive authoritarian regime. Steven Levitsky, co-author of “How Democracies Die,” stated in April 2025 that “we are no longer living in a democratic regime.” Multiple scholarly frameworks confirm we crossed the threshold from democracy into authoritarianism’s early stages. The confusion about when it happened doesn’t change that it did.

That doesn’t mean it’s over.

Understanding where we are on the authoritarian spectrum determines what we’re fighting for and what tactics actually work. The distinction between competitive authoritarianism and consolidated authoritarianism matters more than any other political question right now. One can be reversed in years. The other takes generations. We’re in the first category, but the window is narrowing.

Democracy isn’t about having elections. North Korea has elections. Venezuela has elections. Political scientists use specific operational tests to distinguish democracies from regimes that merely perform democratic rituals.

Levitsky’s test is simple and measurable: is there a cost to opposing the government? When the answer becomes yes, democracy ends. The playing field must be level enough that opposition can realistically win. Loss of power must be accepted as legitimate by incumbents. And two informal norms must operate: mutual toleration (treating rivals as legitimate, not enemies) and institutional forbearance (not using legal powers to their maximum to entrench advantage).

When these conditions disappear, formal institutions remain but democracy dies.

So have we crossed that line? Levitsky thinks so. “I would go as far as to say that today, we are no longer living in a democratic regime. I think we have already crossed the line into competitive authoritarianism very quickly.” His test asks whether credible risk of government retribution exists for opposition. The answer is yes.

The evidence is specific. Federal judges have found probable cause for criminal contempt against the administration for “willfully disregarding” court orders. Judges issue warnings that compliance is “not optional” while lacking enforcement mechanisms if the executive simply refuses. Political opponents face IRS audits and DOJ targeting. Media outlets experience economic pressure and threats. State officials faced direct pressure to overturn election results.

Mutual toleration is gone. Rivals get called “enemies from within” and “vermin.” Institutional forbearance is gone. The administration pardons criminal contempt, defies court orders, and weaponizes agencies. These aren’t predictions about future risks. Multiple scholars confirm these thresholds have been crossed in 2025.

Competitive authoritarianism has a known definition with precise boundaries. It means formal democratic institutions remain “the primary means of gaining power” but rules get violated so systematically that the regime fails minimum democratic standards. Elections still happen. Opposition parties exist. Courts function. Media operates. But all of these operate on a playing field tilted so severely that calling it democratic becomes inaccurate.

Levitsky and Way identify four arenas that determine regime type: electoral, legislative, judicial, and media. In democracy, all four function competitively. In competitive authoritarianism, all four remain contested but compromised. In consolidated authoritarianism, all four effectively close.

Where does the United States fall?

The electoral arena shows systematic tilting but not closure. Gerrymandering produces absurd distortions. Wisconsin’s 2018 State Assembly saw Democrats win 53.6% of votes while Republicans secured 63.6% of seats. Election deniers occupy positions throughout electoral administration. Yet the 2020 election occurred and results were certified despite enormous pressure. The 2022 midterms saw every swing-state election denier running for offices with election oversight lose their race. Opposition can still win. Margins narrow but alternation remains possible. We’re not seeing 70%+ supermajorities yet.

The judicial arena demonstrates the enforcement paradox. Some maverick judges still rule against the government. Federal judges threaten contempt and issue strong warnings. But courts depend on the executive branch for enforcement. The pardon power eliminates criminal contempt deterrence. The Supreme Court grants broad immunity while avoiding confrontation. Formal judicial authority exists. Practical effectiveness approaches zero when the president controls enforcement and can pardon violations.

The media arena maintains pluralism under severe strain. Independent outlets remain legal and influential despite harassment. Reporters Without Borders documented in 2025 that more than half the world’s population now lives where press freedom rates as “very serious” in 42 countries. Economic fragility makes outlets vulnerable to pressure even when direct censorship doesn’t occur.

The legislative arena shows degraded but not eliminated accountability functions. The Senate is effectively shut down for oversight. Military personnel must route communications through the executive before reporting to Congress. But some mechanisms persist.

All four arenas show degradation without closure. That’s the precise definition of competitive authoritarianism.

Competitive authoritarianism doesn’t inevitably become consolidated authoritarianism. But without active resistance, that’s the trajectory. Princeton’s Kim Lane Scheppele studies this process through Hungary’s transformation under Viktor Orbán. Her research documents how Hungary degraded from robust democracy in 2010 to consolidated authoritarianism by the end of that decade, with most damage occurring in the first three years.

Consolidation has measurable markers. Electoral victories climb above 70% through systematic opposition elimination. Judicial capture becomes complete with no maverick judges. Media gets monopolized or eliminated. Legislatures become rubber stamps. These represent qualitative shifts, not just more of the same degradation.

Scheppele documents how Hungary provided the blueprint. She identifies direct coordination between Viktor Orbán’s team and Project 2025. The script involves defunding opponents, purging civil service, and threatening media with economic sanctions. She calls this “autocratic legalism,” using legal mechanisms to systematically dismantle accountability institutions.

Historical data shows competitive authoritarian regimes rarely reverse through elections alone. Levitsky and Way studied 35 such regimes from 1990 to 2008. Successful democratization required extraordinary combinations: mass mobilization, opposition unity, international pressure, and usually either economic crisis or regime splits.

Poland in 2023 offers the clearest recent example. Reversal required all of these simultaneously: record 74% voter turnout, unified opposition, massive street protests, and EU pressure backed by €35 billion in frozen funds. Even then, recovery remains incomplete years later with institutional traps persisting. Poland demonstrates both that reversal is possible and how difficult it proves.

Levitsky calls US recovery “eminently reversible.” Why? The United States has structural advantages. A large wealthy private sector exists independent of government control. A well-organized opposition party operates. Civil society possesses “organizational and financial muscle.”

The requirement is sustained civil society mobilization. Not normal politics. Normal politics cannot fix what competitive authoritarianism breaks. Levitsky criticizes civil society for being “very, very slow to respond.” He notes “the wealthiest, most prominent, most powerful, most privileged members of our civil society have, for the most part, remained on the sideline.”

Daniel Ziblatt warned in September 2023 that “even if we get through the 2024 election with our democracy intact, unless we reform our democracy, we will remain in this fragile position where every national election is a national emergency.” Reform requires “generations of people pushing for institutional changes” similar to women’s suffrage or civil rights movements.

The window exists but gets measured in years, not decades. And it’s narrowing.

Understanding this distinction changes everything about what you’re fighting for and what tactics work. If we were still in democracy, normal politics would function. Vote, advocate, wait for the pendulum to swing. Trust institutions to self-correct.

If we had reached consolidated authoritarianism, the fight would be for recovery over a generation. Like post-Soviet transitions or post-Pinochet Chile. A decades-long project with uncertain outcome.

But competitive authoritarianism occupies the space between. We’re fighting to prevent consolidation. The window gets measured in years. Scheppele’s Hungary research shows this degradation can occur within a decade when resistance fails, with front-loaded damage in the early years. That requires extraordinary mobilization now. Poland-level effort: 74% turnout, unified opposition, sustained pressure. Different tactics, better odds than the consolidated case. But no margin for waiting.

Leading scholars confirm the coup already happened. What matters now is whether we reverse it before it consolidates. That depends entirely on actions taken in the next several years.

What does extraordinary politics mean in practice? State-level resistance using every legal mechanism available. Refusing state cooperation with unconstitutional federal overreach by banning local agencies from assisting federal operations that violate civil liberties. Creating or strengthening state safety nets to replace federal benefits under threat, including Social Security, Medicare, and SNAP. Establishing state-owned financial institutions like North Dakota’s public bank to protect funding and independence. Pushing for or joining multi-state compacts to coordinate healthcare, civil rights defense, infrastructure, and disaster response. Leveraging tax dollars by stopping subsidies to failed red state governance and redirecting funds to protect state residents.

The Constitution and multiple Supreme Court decisions make clear that states cannot be forced to enforce federal laws. Red states have used this principle to block gun safety and abortion access. Blue states can use it to protect civil rights, healthcare, and economic stability.

The legal precedent exists. The money exists. Now it’s on us to demand action.

State officials have the authority to implement these strategies now. Whether they do depends on constituent pressure. Sustained pressure campaigns like Poland’s street protests. Opposition unity across differences. Civil society mobilization from those with the most resources and influence. Making the costs of consolidation higher than the costs of reversal.

The scholars have given us the diagnosis. Competitive authoritarianism. Poland proved reversal works. State officials have the tools. Whether they use them depends entirely on whether constituents make the cost of inaction higher than the cost of resistance.

Here are the state officials with authority to introduce this legislation, direct agencies to refuse cooperation with unconstitutional federal overreach, and coordinate multi-state resistance strategies.

They need to hear from constituents that inaction is not acceptable. They will listen, but only if we make it clear that there will be zero tolerance for bending the knee.

California

Governor Gavin Newsom

Email: governor@governor.ca.gov | Phone: (916) 445-2841

Attorney General Rob Bonta

Phone: (916) 445-9555 | Public Inquiry: (916) 210-6276

Senate President Pro Tempore Mike McGuire

Email: senator.mcguire@senate.ca.gov | Phone: (916) 651-4002

Assembly Speaker Robert Rivas

Email: assemblymember.rivas@assembly.ca.gov | Phone: (916) 319-2029

New York

Governor Kathy Hochul

Phone: (518) 474-8390 | Online form: governor.ny.gov

Attorney General Letitia James

Phone: 1-800-771-7755 | Online form: ag.ny.gov/contact-attorney-general-letitia-james

Senate Majority Leader Andrea Stewart-Cousins

Email: scousins@nysenate.gov | Phone: (518) 455-2585

Assembly Speaker Carl E. Heastie

Email: Speaker@nyassembly.gov | Phone: (518) 455-3791

Illinois

Governor JB Pritzker

Email: Gov.Press@illinois.gov | Phone: (217) 782-0244

Attorney General Kwame Raoul

Phone: (312) 814-3000 (Chicago) | (217) 782-1090 (Springfield)

Senate President Don Harmon

Phone: (217) 782-8176 (Springfield) | (708) 848-2002 (Oak Park)

House Speaker Emanuel “Chris” Welch

Phone: (217) 782-5350 (Springfield) | (708) 450-1000 (District)

Washington

Governor Bob Ferguson

Phone: (360) 902-4111 | Online form: governor.wa.gov/contact

Attorney General Nick Brown

Email: press@atg.wa.gov | Phone: (360) 753-6200

Senate Majority Leader Jamie Pedersen

Email: jamie.pedersen@leg.wa.gov | Phone: (360) 786-7628

House Speaker Laurie Jinkins

Email: laurie.jinkins@leg.wa.gov | Phone: (360) 786-7930

Massachusetts

Governor Maura Healey

Phone: (617) 725-4005 | Toll-free: 1-888-870-7770

Attorney General Andrea Joy Campbell

Email: agoweb@mass.gov | Phone: (617) 727-2200

Senate President Karen E. Spilka

Email: Karen.Spilka@masenate.gov | Phone: (617) 722-1500

House Speaker Ronald J. Mariano

Email: Ronald.Mariano@mahouse.gov | Phone: (617) 722-2500

Colorado

Governor Jared Polis

Email: Governorpolis@state.co.us | Phone: (303) 866-2471

Attorney General Phil Weiser

Email: attorney.general@coag.gov | Phone: (720) 508-6000

Senate President James Coleman

Email: james.coleman@state.co.us | Phone: (303) 866-4879

House Speaker Julie McCluskie

Email: julie.mccluskie.house@coleg.gov | Phone: (303) 866-2923

If you found this article helpful then you may find more useful information in my latest book “Conservatism: America’s Personality Disorder”

https://a.co/d/bEtgrjs-

References

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